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ABSTRACT 
While with traditional QoS-based charging the pricing structure 
mainly reflects the delivered QoS in order to regulate the demand, 
the role of service prices in a Quality of Experience (QoE) 
context is more complex. Amongst others, the charged price may 
in addition have a direct impact on the user's quality perception. 
In this paper, we analyze the structure of the resulting fixpoint 
problem and discuss the corresponding equilibrium. Based on 
recent user trials, additional insight into the characteristics of the 
related feedback loops is provided, before we conclude with 
outlining some consequences for future QoE-based charging 
mechanisms. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences] – Economics 
K.6.0 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
General – Economics 
General Terms 
Economics, Experimentation, Human Factors 
Keywords 
Communication Ecosystems, Quality of Service, Quality of 
Experience, Network Economics, Weber-Fechner Law, Cognitive 
Dissonance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During its amazing evolution into one of the essential pillars of 
modern economy and society, telecommunications has been 
considered first and foremost to be an engineering discipline – 
and deservedly so. However, with the latest success of Internet 
and mobile communications and their progressing convergence 
with traditional fixed-line networking towards unified all IP 
infrastructures, we have reached a level of maturity where – 
despite of all the potential for further improvement – most of the 
fundamental technological problems seem to be basically solved, 
and where therefore telecommunications is about to become a 
commodity whose further development will be more and more 
directed for instance by ecological (green) and user issues, at least 
during the next couple of years. 
In order to account for the resulting strongly interdisciplinary 
perspective, recently the overarching notion of “Communication 
Ecosystems” has been introduced to cover the huge area from 
technical issues to business models and human behavior [14]. 
Historically, the concept of ecosystems is very well established 
especially in the field of biology where it has been first proposed 
by Arthur Tansley already in 1935 for describing communities of 
living organisms together with their physical environment in a 
holistic manner [31]. Notably, the organisms interact with the 
environment as well as amongst each other, the latter one often in 
a hierarchical way, for instance in the form of a food chain (where 
the main type of interaction between organisms on different 
hierarchy levels is equivalent to “eating or being eaten”). Typical 
examples of biological ecosystems include garden ponds, lakes, 
coral reefs, rainforests, deserts, savannas etc. 
In a straightforward analogy, the communication ecosystem 
may hence be characterized as the community of private and 
business customers using telecommunication services based on a 
technological environment (including e.g. networks as well as 
customer equipment) which interact with each other. Again, we 
notice clearly hierarchical structures both in terms of technology 
(as represented e.g. by the layers of the ISO/OSI model) as well 
as in terms of related value network structures which range from 
traditional network operators over ISPs (Internet Service 
Providers) and ASPs (Application Service Providers) up to the so-
called OTTs (Over-The-Top providers) like Google, Amazon et 
al. The corresponding ecosystem thus integrates both the 
engineering and the user perspective, mediated by micro-
economic and game-theoretic models for user and provider 
cooperation and/or competition. 
This paper addresses a typical research issue arising in this 
interdisciplinary context where technology meets economic and 
user issues, and deals with the question of how to charge for 
Quality of Experience (QoE). While previous work (like e.g. 
described in [20]) has mainly focused on a general analysis of the 
problem and proposed some potential charging mechanisms, this 
paper approaches the problem from a more formal point of view 
and describes it in terms of a fixpoint problem which, in addition 
to delivered service quality, also takes user context and 
expectations as well as economic feedback into account.  
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
Valuetools’12, October 9-12, 2012, Cargèse, Corsica, France. 
Copyright 2012 ACM 1-58113-000-0/00/0010 …$15.00. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 
2 discusses briefly the transition from QoS to QoE and reviews 
some related work. Section 3 introduces and analyzes this new 
type of fixpoint problems which is fundamental for QoE-based 
charging, while Section 4 presents an overview on user trial 
results which may serve as initial empirical evidence for further 
understanding the specific shape of the underlying mappings.  
The paper closes with some conclusions and an outlook on current 
and future work. 
2. QUALITY HAS ITS PRICE 
While the idea of providing Quality of Service (QoS) in 
communication networks has been around in the research 
community for more than two decades by now, in practice QoS is 
still short of being appropriately realized in state of the art 
network architectures (see for instance the difficult history of the 
IETF IntServ and DiffServ architecture proposals as well as, more 
recently, the ailing evolution of 3GPP’s and ETSI’s IMS 
initiative). Instead, we currently observe a strong dominance of 
flat rate tariffs, which may be convenient for the customers, but  
are also known to be far from being economically efficient, as 
they lead straight into the so-called “tragedy of the commons” [3]; 
moreover, flat rate prices are severely limiting the possibilities of 
maintaining or increasing operator revenues, which may limit 
future investments.  
On the other hand, conviction is growing among network 
operators and ISPs that quality has become and will stay one of 
the key differentiators on the increasingly competitive telco 
market. At the same time, it turns out that service quality in this 
sense needs a much stronger orientation along the user and 
customer experience than traditional QoS research with its 
standard focus on improving technical network parameters like 
bandwidth, packet loss rate, transmission delay and jitter, etc, is 
offering. 
This is also in line with recent developments within the 
research community which aim at redirecting quality research 
towards the original meaning of QoS as collective effect of service 
performance which determines the degree of satisfaction of a user 
of the service [1]. To this end, a few years ago the notion of 
“Quality of Experience” (QoE) has been coined to explicitly put 
back the user into the centre of investigation. The most 
widespread definition of QoE as overall acceptability of an 
application or service, as perceived subjectively by the end-user 
is due to ITU-T [2] is still subject of current discussions. Amongst 
others, most recently the following definition proposal has been 
developed and agreed within the European COST Action IC1003 
“QualiNet” [17]: Quality of Experience (QoE) is the degree of 
delight or annoyance of the user of an application or service. It 
results from the fulfillment of his or her expectations with respect 
to the utility and/or enjoyment of the application or service in the 
light of the user’s personality and current state. 
Within this discussion, we argue that the transition from QoS 
to QoE is of a far more significant nature than a mere replacement 
of one buzzword by another one, and should rather be viewed as a 
quite fundamental paradigm change [28]. Indeed, a comparison of 
currently discussed QoE models quickly reveals that this new 
quality notion of course still depends on the QoS delivered by the 
underlying networks, but in addition takes multiple further aspects 
into thorough account. K. Kilkki [14] for instance restricts the 
range of QoS to managing the interactions between applications 
running in end-user terminals, and refers to QoE as the human 
side of the service provision and consumption which in addition 
depends on roles like user or customer – hence he proposes a 
further distinction into Quality of Experience, Quality of User 
Experience (QUE), Quality of Customer Experience (QCE), and 
(tentatively) even Quality of Group Members Experience (QGE, 
see [15]).  
In a similar way, the “quality chain” model presented in [22] 
conceives QoE as a concatenation between network-level QoS 
which describes quality in the core and access and can be quite 
dynamic, and Quality of Design (QoD) as a less variable but 
strongly user-dependent concept which takes mainly the 
intuitiveness of the interaction with the physical end device and 
the usability of the respective application and hardware interfaces 
into account. Note that this approach allows nicely decoupling 
technological from human-centric impact factors in the resulting 
QoE metric. 
Another comprehensive QoE model has recently been 
proposed by K. Laghari et al. [16] and is based on distinguishing 
three main domains organized into two layers together with the 
interaction between them. In the bottom layer, the “Technological 
& Business Domain” reflects technological parameters as well as 
business goals and is paired up with a “Contextual Domain” 
integrating spatial (physical and virtual) and temporal aspects of 
the current user condition. Both these domains interact with each 
other as well as with the top layer “QoE Domain” which includes 
both subjective and objective QoE metrics, while the way the 
human entity is concerned again depends on her role as user or 
customer (thus following closely Kilkki’s proposal).  
The user context plays also a major role in the QoE 
framework proposed by De Moor et al. [4] and is claimed to 
provide the link between QoS as an objective quality concept and 
User Experience (UX) as its subjective counterpart which, for 
instance, includes user expectations, feelings, thoughts, behavior 
etc. Note that, later in this paper, we will conceive pricing as one 
of the pivotal characteristics in this contextual domain, which will 
turn out to be the key for understanding the difference between 
charging for QoS and charging for QoE. 
In addition to the lack of user orientation, R. Jain [13] points 
out another reason for the notorious difficulty of introducing QoS-
enabled architectures in the current Internet, i.e. the missing 
integration of economical aspects. He argues that QoS techniques 
without clear relationship to charging policies have failed in the 
past throughout; in this sense he follows B. Stiller’s remark on the 
fundamental intimate relationship between the quality of a 
delivered service and the way customers are charged for it [29]. 
As a consequence, currently running research projects like, e.g., 
the EU FP7 IP ETICS (Economics and Technologies for Inter-
Carrier Services) [18], increasingly aim at integrating both 
economical and technical aspects jointly into the development of 
future architectures for QoS-enabled Internet services. 
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Figure 1. Model 1 (Charging for QoS) 
It is out of scope of this paper to review in detail the rich 
body of related work on Internet charging and pricing schemes for 
QoS-enabled services, and we refer to overview papers like [30] 
or [32] instead. It is, however, important to briefly revisit the very 
basic idea of charging for QoS as sketched in Fig. 1.  
According to this simple model, QoS-based charging usually 
boils down to measuring or estimating one or more QoS 
parameters as input for a charging mechanism which determines 
the corresponding price (to be paid by the customer) based on 
predefined tariff functions. Note that this implies already a 
feedback cycle (Fig. 1), as the chosen tariff in general regulates 
the customer demand, which itself may have a direct impact on 
the network load and thus, assuming finite capacities, on the 
delivered service quality.  
We can easily regard this as a dynamic process where tariffs 
(and hence prices) are variable and drive the demand towards an 
equilibrium where the delivered QoS equals the user’s willingness 
to pay for it. For instance with usage-based charging, low prices 
will cause increasing demand and thus will put pressure on the 
network, while an optimal tariff is equivalent to a fixpoint (Nash 
equilibrium) where the price for the delivered quality equals the 
willingness to pay of the users1.  
Formally speaking, let p indicate the price, d the demand and 
q the QoS. Then, the model of Fig. 1 is equivalent to the 
following recursive set of equations: 
 price function                  )(qpp =  (1) 
demand function              )( pdd =  (2) 
QoS function                    )(dqq =  (3) 
In other words: the price to be paid is determined as a 
function of the delivered QoS, the demand depends on the price, 
and the service quality to be offered is ruled by the size of the 
demand (which is the case as long as resources are finite or 
scarce, which is expected to remain true at least for mobile access 
in the foreseeable future). Moreover, we may assume continuity 
of these functions as well as that the demand function d(p) and the 
quality function q(d) are both monotonically decreasing, whereas 
the price function p(q) is increasing monotonically. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trivial Stable Fixpoint for Model 1 
                                                                
1 Note that, in classic microeconomics, the relationship 
between price and resulting demand is broadly captured through 
the concept of “price elasticity” [19], while in our model the 
impact of the demand level on the quality of the product adds 
another independent dimension. 
 
For the purpose of illustration, suppose that p, d, and q are 
normalized to the unit interval each, and hence p(0) = 0, p(1) = 1, 
d(0) = 1, d(1) = 0, q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0. Then, the system (1)-(3) 
has only two trivial fix points, i.e. (p*,d*,q*) = (0,1,0) and (1,0,1), 
respectively. Note that (1,0,1) is a stable fix point (i.e. an 
attractor), whereas (0,1,0) is unstable, see Fig. 2 for a typical 
example assuming that “demand function” d is a convex function, 
the “congestion function” q representing the dependency of QoS 
on demand is concave (i.e. the load situation and thus QoS 
worsens significantly if the demand is approaching the capacity 
limit), and the “price function” p depends linearly on the QoS. 
Note that in Fig. 2 (as well as later in Fig. 4), the x-axis and y-axis 
each run from 0 to 1 (i.e. the functions have been scaled to unit 
intervals), while the first three iterations of the equation system 
(1)-(3) are denoted by the numbers   . The equilibrium 
price is marked with an arrow in the graph of the demand 
function.  
Hence, we may conclude that for the rather simple Model 1, 
there are two potential options: (1) provide the service “for free” 
(only a fixed fee for access, but without any usage- or quality 
based tariff component) and on a best-effort base, i.e. without 
QoS guarantees; (2) as soon as service usage or quality is 
charged, it should be offered as an (expensive) premium service 
with top-level QoS. This is of course in most cases not consistent 
with the interest of the network operator which aims at 
maximizing its revenue, i.e. max d(p)⋅p, leading to an interior 
solution point (i.e. d(p) ≠ 0 ≠ p) for the resulting optimal price and 
quality. 
The interplay between price, demand and QoS is captured in 
a particularly original way with Odlyzko’s Paris Metro Pricing 
(PMP) scheme [20], where different QoS classes are charged 
differently (but are not at all different in any other respect rather 
than the price) and thus attract (or repel) customers based on their 
willingness to pay until a QoS (in this case: congestion) gap 
between the different classes is achieved as a direct effect of the 
gap in prices. For the case of two classes with linear congestion 
and separable utility functions including a parameter expressing 
the user-dependent preference for lack of congestion, Gibbens, 
Mason and Steinberg [10] have nicely demonstrated the resulting 
Nash equilibrium by introducing the notion of a “marginal user” 
whose utility is identical for joining either of the classes. In fact, 
due to the direct integration of user preferences, this model of 
PMP can already be interpreted as a key example of extending 
purely QoS-based charging as described with the model of Fig. 1 
towards schemes that are based on QoE rather than QoS. The 
remainder of this paper will develop this transition in more detail. 
Summarizing, we conclude that QoS-based charging has 
become a mature research topic within the area of Network 
Economics. On the other hand, charging for QoE has hardly 
received a similar attention in the literature so far, despite of the 
recent strong increase of interest in QoE-related topics. Therefore, 
in [21] we have provided a rather generic discussion about how to 
apply fundamental charging principles in a QoE context which 
has been further extended in [23]. In contrast, the present paper 
aims at contributing to the formal analysis of QoE-based 
charging. To this end, the subsequent section will present and 
discuss an extension of the model depicted in Fig. 1 which 
explicitly takes a new role of prices in QoE  into account. 
d
q
p
d
q
p

 
0 0
11
0 1
1


 


11
demand
function
QoS
function price
function
3. CHARGING FOR QOE: EXTENDED 
FIXPOINT PROBLEM AND SOLUTION 
In the previous section we have already covered the fundamental 
and inherent relationship between providing service quality and 
charging for it; for the case of QoS, this has led to a plethora of 
proposals for related pricing and charging schemes. Considering 
the transition from QoS to QoE which puts the concept of service 
quality into a much broader and interdisciplinary framework, the 
question arises rather naturally which implications this has in 
terms of charging for QoE. In the rest of this paper, we will 
discuss this issue from a formal perspective and survey some 
current work on individual aspects.  
Coming back to the rather simple model depicted in Fig. 1, 
we can summarize the related charging mechanism as follows: 
one or more appropriately monitored QoS parameters serve as 
input to a charging scheme which applies some tariff function in 
order to determine the price to be paid by the user as output. In 
this sense, the user pays for delivered QoS.  
Transfering this approach to the case of QoE-based charging, 
it turns out that the situation is much more complicated here, 
especially because the role of pricing is gaining additional new 
facets. While we can safely assume that charges are still paid by 
the user for receiving a certain level of service quality, the level 
of service quality is now determined from the user perspective 
rather than on the networking level only. This implies a crucial 
difference: the charge to be paid appears not only as output of the 
applied charging mechanism, but at the same time becomes part 
of the user context, i.e. the Contextual Domain according to [16], 
if it comes to evaluating the Quality of Experience. In other 
words: the price to be paid for a certain service quality, or at least 
the expected price for it, may have a direct influence on the way 
the user evaluates this service quality. In this sense, it becomes 
part of the bundle of user expectations towards the delivered 
service.  
A straightforward example for this janiform role of pricing is 
provided by well-known VoIP services like Skype which operate 
for free. In terms of user experience, the fact that people know 
that they do not have to pay anything for using Skype naturally 
influences their judgement on the delivered service quality and 
increases their tolerance with respect to noise, delay or session 
cancellation effects. On the other hand, for premium 
communication services we may suspect an opposite behavior: the 
more the customer is expecting to pay, the higher his expectations 
concerning service quality will be. Later in this paper, this will be 
supported by experimental evidence. 
 
Charging
QoE
demand
priceQoS
 
 
Figure 3. Model 2 (Charging for QoE) 
In order to capture this role change, Fig. 3 provides an 
extended feedback model of charging for QoE. Observe that in 
line with the QoE models mentioned in section 2, QoS parameters 
continue to play an important role, but do no longer serve as 
direct input to the charging scheme. Instead, together with pricing 
(and several other factors depending, e.g., on the used application, 
which are not explicitly mentioned in the diagram, see for 
instance [27]) it serves as determinant for the QoE evaluation, and 
it is the joint result of the latter which now provides the essential 
input for the charging mechanism. 
The formal description of this second model is more 
complex than it was the case with Model 1. Let again d indicate 
the demand, q the QoS, p the price as well as x the QoE. Then we 
have the following set of recursive equations: 
price function                   )(xpp =  (4) 
demand function              )( pdd =  (5) 
QoS function                    )(dqq =  (6) 
QoE function                    ),( pqxx =  (7) 
where equation (7) reflects the multidimensional nature of QoE. 
To simplify the situation, assume x to be separable, i.e.  
                             )()(),( 21 pxqxpqx ⋅=  (8) 
which can be interpreted as follows: the QoE depends first of all 
on the underlying network QoS (quality function x1), which is 
then weighted according to the user expectations due to the price 
to be paid (expectation function x2). 
Fig. 4 sketches a typical example for the second model, 
depicting the first five iterations (    ) and indicating 
their convergence to the equilibrium state indicated by the arrow 
in the first graph. Again, all functions have been scaled to the unit 
interval [0,1], while the axes are left blank in order to enhance 
readability. Compared to Fig. 2, demand and QoS functions have 
been left unchanged. At the bottom of the figure, the functions x1 
and x2 as introduced in equation (8) are depicted, where x1 is 
assumed to be concave (we will justify this later), and x2 is 
assumed to be linear with x2(1) = 0.5, i.e. for a given QoS, a high 
price may reduce the QoE by 50%. In fact, linearity in this place  
does not provide more than a very rough approximation (we will 
discuss this difficulty in detail in Section 4.3), and the particular 
form chosen for equation (7) is also due to enhancing the resulting 
illustration of convergence, as scaling x2 to the unit interval (as 
we have done with the other functions) would just further speed 
up the convergence without changing the basic qualitative 
behavior.  
It is straightforward to derive that similar to Model 1, Model 
2 has again an unstable trivial fixpoint for the chosen scenario at 
(p*,d*,q*,x*) = (0,1,0,0); moreover, from Fig. 4 we learn that the 
additional feedback loop between price and QoE leads to the 
establishment of a second non-trivial (and stable) fixpoint. As 
mentioned, again the equilibrium price is marked with an arrow. 
Indeed, this indicates a significant difference between both 
models. In order to justify the underlying assumptions, in the 
following section we will discuss in more detail the mappings and 
functional relationships, and present some results and empirical 
evidence from recent and currently running user studies. 
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Figure 4. Non-trivial Stable Fixpoint for Model 2  
(First Five Iterations) 
 
4. CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTIES OF 
UNDERLYING FUNCTIONS 
In this section, we will have a closer look to the individual 
functions making up the system of equations (4)-(8), and further 
discuss their specific shapes.  
4.1 Demand and QoS Functions 
Describing demand curves subject to price setting has been 
widely discussed in the classical microeconomic literature. 
Amongst others, Friedman has extensively captured these 
relationships in [9], and typically recommends to propose non-
linear curves for this interdependency. Following this rich body of 
literature, in our above analysis we have used a convex demand 
function (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 top). Note that we may safely date 
back the discovery of general relationships to economic research 
almost a century ago (see for instance the discussion of price 
elasticity of demand in A. Marshall’s ground-breaking work [19], 
published in the first edition already in 1890), while particular 
demand curves still must be regarded as one of the most important 
business secrets of companies even today. 
The QoS function is basically determined by the relationship 
between supply (capacity) and demand, as increasing network 
load in the case of finite capacities sooner or later leads to 
congestion and results in decreasing QoS. It is however difficult 
to agree on a standard model for such a function, as the impact of 
high load in a communication network significantly depends on 
congestion control and/or avoidance mechanisms in place. In any 
case, QoS metrics like packet loss rate (PLR) may not linearly be 
linked to demand [33]; instead it is typical that low and medium 
congestion level can easily be compensated by the network, 
leaving the PLR close to zero, whereas high levels of congestion 
may cause abrupt increases and/or a steep slope of the PLR curve. 
Therefore, we propose to use concave and monotonically 
decreasing QoS functions in our models, while, as already 
mentioned, the detailed characteristics of such a curve are subject 
to the chosen protocols and scheduling discipline. 
4.2 QoE Function: The Weber-Fechner Law  
Determining a functional relationship between network QoS and 
user-perceived QoE is one of the core topics of interest in current 
QoE research, with results depending heavily on the QoS 
parameter considered. Especially for the case of bandwidth, a 
series of recent studies has established a logarithmic dependency 
for a couple of interesting scenarios including VoIP and mobile 
broadband [27]. As discussed extensively in [24], a similar 
logarithmic dependency, known as Weber-Fechner Law, is 
considered to be characteristic for a wide range of the human 
sensory system (hearing, viewing, smelling), and as such has 
become fundamental to the entire research field of psychophysics. 
In a subsequent step, the above mentioned results also provide 
empirical evidence for the new established “WQL hypothesis” 
claiming that the  relationship between Waiting time t and its QoE 
evaluation on a linear ACR scale is Logarithmic [5], which 
immediately bridges the gap towards psychological research on 
the perception of time. 
For all these scenarios, we may consider bandwidth as a kind 
of stimulus which triggers certain QoE judgements on the side of 
the user – the larger the bandwidth, the higher the QoE. In our 
analysis, we follow this approach and propose concave functions 
like the logarithm as “QoE function” during the analysis of the 
fixpoint structure of Model 2 (see Fig. 4 bottom left). Note, 
however, that this is not the only fundamental law between QoS 
and QoE. For instance, if we consider QoS change in terms of an 
impairment rather than a stimulus (for instance due to an 
increasing packet loss rate), Fiedler et al. postulate an exponential 
dependency. This so-called “IQX hypothesis” [8] is highly 
interesting as well, its validity has already been verified for 
specific VoIP codecs (like iLBC) using PESQ. 
4.3 Expectation Function: M3I User Study 
The expectation function x2 is probably the least explored one in 
our model. For the particular scenario of video quality, D. Hands 
[7] reports on an experiment performed within the EU project 
M3I in 2001 where user expectations with respect to pricing have 
been controlled by the simple step of assigning each user 
arbitrarily to one of three classes (gold, silver, bronze) and 
convincing her that gold class members are charged higher than 
silver class members etc. The participants have then been 
presented identical video material where quality differentiation 
has been realized via a variable frame rate (between 1 and 25 
frames per second). For each video, QoE parameters like 
acceptability, MOS (Mean Opinion Score) evaluation and 
willingness to pay have been collected. 
As an interesting result of this user trial, it turns out that 
users who have been classified as gold customers evaluate for 
instance the acceptability of an offered service quality 
significantly lower than silver and bronze users. Also with respect 
to willingness to pay, clear differences between the three classes 
have been observed, see [23] for a more detailed discussion. Thus, 
we may conclude that there is evidence for an influence on 
expected charges on the QoE evaluation results, however there is 
a clear need for further research before we are in a position to 
propose to determine reliably the shape of a suitable expectation 
function. For the time being, we have therefore included a linear 
function (see Fig. 4 bottom right) where we assume that high 
tariffs reduce the QoE value by 50%. 
 
4.4 Price Function 
As far as the mapping from service quality to the price actually 
charged is concerned (Fig. 2 righthand side and Fig. 4. top row 
righthand side), there is a variety of options depending on the 
specific scenarios (for instance applications producing elastic 
traffic like file download or email vs applications with non-elastic 
traffic characteristic like voice over IP or video on demand), see 
[21] for further details. For reasons of simplicity, for both our 
models we have chosen the identity function, i.e. the user is 
charged in proportion to the delivered quality. 
4.5 ETICS User Trials 
Partially inspired by the M3I experiments described above [7], a 
larger-scale user trial has recently been conducted within the 
ETICS project [18], in order to address the notoriously difficult 
task of approximating the users' willingness to pay for enhanced 
network quality from classical QoE curves and thus to enhance 
our understanding of the key forces behind the interweaved 
quality-price relationship leading to purchases [25]. The goal of 
this user trial was to empirically investigate the users' willingness 
to pay for improved network video quality by adapting network 
parameters in direct relation to purchasing decisions. While in 
principle every QoS metric could serve as a suitable starting 
point, for our experiments we have chosen the packet loss rate 
(PLR) for reasons of technical feasibility, intuitiveness and 
comparability to related QoE results available from literature.  
 
 
Figure 5. Technical Setup of the ETICS Study (cf [25]) 
 
The technical setup of the ETICS study is sketched in Fig. 5. 
A large collection of video stream stored on a Linux server allows 
test participants to choose suitable content which is matching their 
interest. The video transmission quality is impaired in real-time 
through a netem2 command which allows to set random packet 
loss rates in an arbitrary way. The videos are streamed via a Mac 
Mini server to a directly connected flat screen TV. 
All in all, more than 40 users have participated in this test 
which has been conducted in FTW’s i:lab facilities3 in the fall of 
2011, see [25] for demographic details. In order to be as close to 
reality as possible, we have followed the approach of [7] and have 
                                                                
2 see http://www.linuxfoundation.org/collaborate/workgroups/ 
networking/netem; last access 20-07-2012. 
3 see http://www.ftw.at/portfolio/i-lab?set_language=en; last 
access 20-07-2012 
provided test participants with real money (10 Euro in total), 
leaving it entirely to their decision whether to spend this money 
during the trial for enhancing the network transmission quality 
(and hence the perceived video quality) or to save it for later 
individual spending. 
Note that this experimental setting for video on demand 
(VoD) service quality covers a significant portion of Model 2, 
starting from varying QoS conditions which lead to differentiated 
quality perception; at the same time, we are probing explicitly the 
users' willingness to pay for the resulting video QoE. However, 
the additional feedback cycle from price to QoE which is 
characteristic for Model 2 has not been addressed in this 
experiment.  
Fig. 6 depicts the overall average spending behavior for each 
of the 44 test participants. Note that the maximum amount which 
could be spent for one video has been set to € 1.50 in accordance 
with current tariff structures in the VoD business. As an important 
result, we observe a broad willingness to purchase network 
quality upgrades; in fact, around 20% of the participants decided 
to spend always the maximum price and thus went for optimal 
QoE throughout, whereas roughly 10% of the participants were 
behaving extremely reluctant and did not spend anything for 
quality upgrades. The remaining 70% of the test population have 
used the offer to adapt their quality experience with rather fine 
granularity to their actual interests and needs. Thus, the trial has 
also revealed a set of interesting differences in terms of the user’s 
strategic behavior which are further discussed in [25]. 
 
 
Figure 6. Average Actual Spending for QoE  
(per movie per user) 
 
4.6 Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena 
Building upon the ETICS trials described in the previous section, 
we will now discuss an interesting discrepancy between user 
satisfaction and their quality estimation inferred from the trial 
results. Questioning the participants about their quality 
acceptance (“Would you consume this video in the presented 
quality at home?”), the study of [25] has revealed surprisingly 
positive results, even for low quality levels. Also the subjective 
video quality assessments were unexpectedly positive and 
uncritical. Therefore, in [26] we propose to follow  the socio-
psychological theory of cognitive dissonance [10] for a proper 
explanation of these inconsistencies based on human irrationality. 
Facing a set of contradictory cognitions, e.g., low price and low 
quality, the decision-making process related to purchasing 
requires the individual to find an internal equilibrium, i.e., a 
decision how contradictory cognitions are personally handled. In 
our case, this means that, while poor video qualities may be rated 
equivalently by individuals in pure quality ratings via Mean 
Opinion Score (MOS), an active purchasing decision (probably at 
low price) positively biases the acceptance rating of customers, 
i.e., even poor video qualities would tend to receive high 
acceptance rates. 
 While such a sugarcoating does not only give strong support 
for the existence of a price loopback on quality perceptions and 
service satisfaction, this also renders opportunities for intentional 
economic utilizations. Although the customer segment of discount 
offers (low cost and low quality) has not attracted sufficient 
interest in networking recently, it may serve as an interesting use 
case supporting the transition to quality differentiated services. 
Enforcing an active decision on a low price and low quality offer 
(due to subjectively less attractive other offers) may still educe 
acceptable customer satisfaction on average. Hence, the 
introduction of higher QoS offers may intentionally be linked to 
the proposition of low quality offers.  
Economically, the understanding of cognitive dissonance 
may also be used to influence purchasing decision through 
advertisements or branding effects in general. While a product 
may be too expensive to be rationally purchased, the 
advertisement gives rise to the positive product aspects appealing 
to the positive cognitions. In turn, a user may selectively a priori 
or a posteriori collect or even distribute such information in order 
to justify and blandish an expensive and hence irrational 
purchase: Why should we accent the price of our new luxury car, 
when we can boast about its performance? Similar principles may 
be transferred to networking, where users need to be given 
arguments blandishing negative aspects of upgrading decisions. 
Hence, advertisement may be used for internationally modifying 
the discrepancy between pure quality ratings and the users' 
willingness to pay for this quality. 
4.7 Discussion 
In Section 4, we have surveyed related work as well as recent 
empirical evidence in order to better understand the shapes of the 
individual functions which make up the feedback cycles of Model 
1 and Model 2. Whereas demand and price functions have already 
been treated in the standard economical literature to a far more 
than sufficient extent, the mapping of demand (traffic) to QoS is 
heavily depending on congestion control algorithms and protocols 
employed in the network. Determining the shape of the QoE 
function which represents the relation between user-perceived 
quality and network QoS is subject of intensive current research 
activities, which have led to first results like the Weber-Fechner 
Law and the IQX hypothesis. Moreover, the topic of quantifying 
the impact of price expectations onto QoE evaluation is still in its 
infancy – we have presented some indicative evidence, but there 
is a clear need for much more research into this direction. Hence, 
altogether the individual interrelationships integrated into Model 
2 are far from being equally mature; nevertheless we argue that 
the functions we have chosen to analyze the fixpoint problem in 
Section 3 can be considered representative for a broad set of 
interesting and relevant scenarios.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has been devoted to investigating a simple model for 
the interplay between network QoS, user perceived QoE, the 
prices to be charged for providing quality, the traffic (demand) 
generated due to the tariff schemes employed, and back to 
implications for network QoS due to resulting congestion in the 
network. It turns out that all these dependencies need individual 
treatment using an interdisciplinary approach joining economical, 
psychological and technological methodologies, and thus 
represents a highly interesting example for a research topic in the 
area of communication ecosystems. Analysing the resulting 
feedback cycle reveals that QoS-based charging leads either to 
provisioning best effort services for low fees which do not depend 
on the offered quality (i.e. basically flat rates), or highly 
expensive top-level quality. However, we have seen that none of 
these solutions is of interest to the network operators which first 
of all aim at maximizing their revenue. But as soon as we 
consider QoE as a fundamental quality concept to be charged for, 
the situation changes and a stable, non-trivial fixpoint appears 
which balances the tradeoff between user expectations, offered 
QoS and price. 
 Of course, the fact that today flat rate schemes can safely be 
considered to be the dominating way to charge for communication 
traffic and services has to be ascribed to a plethora of reasons, 
including the customer interest in simple, transparent and reliable 
tariffs which do not deliver major surprises at the end of the 
month. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis provides at least 
some indication that a stronger focus on user perceived quality 
might also change the perspective on future charging mechanisms 
and contribute to re-establishing a way of tariffing which avoids 
the notorious “tragedy of the commons” mentioned in the 
beginning and aims at achieving economic efficiency instead. 
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